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Forfeiture of a Vehicle: Search For a Nexus
Griffis v. State'
Enroute from Tallahassee to Stuart in his 1973 Dodge pick-up truck,
Griffis was stopped by a Florida Inspector of Agriculture and Con-
sumer Services and ordered to return to an inspection station. At the
station, the inspector searched Griffis and his vehicle and seized an un-
ascertained amount of cocaine and marijuana. Griffis pled nolo con-
tendere to the charge of possession of marijuana, and the state dis-
missed the companion cocaine charge. Shortly thereafter, the state
moved for forfeiture proceedings of the seized truck pursuant to the
Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act [hereinafter cited as
the UCTA]. 2
When Griffis failed to show cause why his pick-up truck should
not be forfeited under the Florida UCTA, the trial court ordered its
forfeiture.3 Griffis' subsequent appeal of this order raised significant
1. Griffis v. State, 356 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1978).
2. FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41-44 (Supp. 1974). The Florida Uniform Contraband
Transportation Act consolidated the narcotics contraband and illegally sold food and
beverages forfeiture statutes. FLA. STAT. Y 943.42 states that:
It is unlawful: (1) To transport, carry or convey any contraband article in, upon
or by means of any vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft. (2) To conceal or possess
any contraband article in or upon any vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft. (3) To
use any vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft to facilitate the transportation, car-
riage, conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter, ex-
change, or giving away of any contraband article.
FLA. STAT. § 943.44 then provides for forfeiture proceedings:
The state attorney within whose jurisdicton the vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft
has been seized because of its use or attempted use in violation of any provisions
of law dealing with contraband . . . may proceed against the vessel, motor vehi-
cle, or aircraft by rule to show cause . . . and may have such vessel, motor ve-
hicle, or aircraft forfeited to the use of, or to be sold by, the law enforcement
agency making the seizure, upon producing due proof that the vessel, motor ve-
hicle, or aircraft was being used in violation of the provisions of said law.
3. Griffis at 298. One of the unique features of a forfeiture provision is the bur-
den of proof. The State Attorney submits a rule to show cause motion to the court. At
that point, the burden shifts to the defendant to show why the vehicle should not be
forfeited. A recent successful forfeiture contest in the Second District Court of Appeal,
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questions concerning the constitutionality and scope of Florida forfei-
ture proceedings.
In Griffis,4 the Supreme Court of Florida held that the state must
demonstrate a "nexus" between a vehicle seized'and illegal trafficking
of contraband, to justify a forfeiture order. No longer is mere posses-
sion of contraband within a vehicle sufficient to sustain a forfeiture
order.
The ultimate issue left unanswered in Griffis remains the nature of
the nexus which supports forfeiture of a vehicle. Should the quantity of
contraband be determinative of a finding that a vehicle is being used
illegally? For example, does possession of a substantial quantity of con-
traband in a vehicle justify forfeiture proceedings, presuming posses-
sion with intent to sell and concurrent use of that vehicle in facilitating
the sale? Will using a vehicle as transportation to the point of the
transfer or sale of contraband articles be sufficient to justify forfeiture
proceedings? Will the mere act of selling contraband in a vehicle justify
its forfeiture? The Griffis court looked beyond Florida cases and con-
sidered federal authority in arriving at its opinion.' As did the Griffis
court, we must examine precedent from many sources to describe the
nexus criteria.
FEDERAL CASE LAW
The Florida UCTA was written in 1974 with the express legisla-
tive intent to "achieve uniformity between the laws of Florida and the
laws of the United States, which was necessary and desirable for effec-
tive drug abuse prevention and control."' The history of forfeiture pro-
ceedings under federal case law, therefore, bears directly on any in-
One 1973 Cadillac v. State, 372 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1979), attacked the
trial court forfeiture order on the burden of proof issue. The appellant, Mr. Jack Ag-
new, Sr., explained that the car forfeited was the property of the corporation, and he
did not know that his son, in whose possession the car was seized, was involved in any
illegal enterprise. In its holding the court stated that: "The seizing agency may release
said vessel, motor vehicle, or aircraft to the innocent party or lienholder upon the filing
of a sworn affidavit by said innocent party or lienholder that he had no knowledge of
the alleged violation causing such seizure and upon then producing a valid certificate of
titie." Id. at 104.
4. Id. at 297.
5. Id. at 297, 300-02.
6. Chapter 73-331, Laws of Florida (1974), introductory language to act.
2
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tepretation of the Florida statute.
Under the federal contraband statute,7 two federal district courts
ordered the forfeiture of motor vehicles where the driver possessed nar-
cotic substances. In United States v. One 1975 Mercury Monarch,8 the
appellate court upheld the magistrate's order of forfeiture of the Mer-
cury even though there was minimal showing as to any significant
amount of contraband within the car. This case involved an automobile
owner who was arrested after he left his building where marijuana
crates were stored.9 Subsequent to his arrest, the officers searched him
and the car, finding cocaine on him and a suitcase containing mari-
juana residue in the trunk of the car.1" The court held that the facts
were sufficient to sustain a forfeiture order although it was indicated
that more than mere possession of contraband by a driver of a vehicle
was necessary to uphold a forfeiture under the forfeiture act.,' The
court found that the similarity in appearance of the marijuana in the
suitcase with that in the crates took the case beyond mere possession,' 2
the suitcase providing the sufficient nexus to justify forfeiture.
The same district court, in United States v. One 1973 Jaguar
Coupe,1 3 sustained a forfeiture order where the forfeitee's car was being
driven by her boyfriend who was searched and subsequently charged
with possession of cocaine." The court rejected her contention that the
vehicle had no substantial connection to drug trafficking because she
was not present nor had she any knowledge concerning the seized co-
7. 49 U.S.C. § 781 (1976) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful (1) to transport, carry, or convey any contraband arti-
cle in, upon, or by means of any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft; (2) to conceal or
possess any contraband article in or upon any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft; or (3)
to use any vessel, vehicle, or aircraft to facilitate the transportation, carriage,
conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter, exchange,
or giving away of any contraband article.
Also see 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1976) which requires that, "[a]ny vessel, vehicle, or aircraft
which has been used in violation of any provision of section 781 of this title, or in,
upon, or by means of which any violation of said section has taken or is taking place,
shall be seized and forfeited ....
8. 423 F. Supp. 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
9. Id. at 1030.
10. Id. at 1032.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. 431 F. Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
14. Id. at 129.
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caine. 15 Hence, the owner was deprived of her property with a minimal
showing of a link between her actions and the contraband in question.
Both of these cases upheld forfeiture where the driver was arrested in
the vehicle and was charged with, at least, possession of narcotics.
The district court sitting in New Hampshire, in United States v.
One 1972 Datsun,8 reversed a magistrate's order forfeiting an automo-
bile after government agents followed the owner in his Datsun to two
locations where they purchased approximately 5,000 doses of lysergic
acid diethylamide. 17 In reversing the order, the court said that "to be
forfeited, a vehicle must have some substantial connection to, or be
instrumental in the commission of, the underlying activity which the
statute seeks to prevent.""8
The result in Datsun, when compared to the results in Mercury
and Jaguar, can be distinguished in that there was no showing of pos-
session of contraband by the driver of the vehicle. However, Datsun
appears closer to the threshold requirement set out in Mercury, as
there was a direct relationship between the use of the automobile in the
facilitation of the sale of contraband and the forfeiture.
Criteria for the forfeiture of contraband involved vehicles are
emerging from circuit court cases reviewing forfeiture orders on ap-
peal. United States v. One 1971 Chevrolet Corvette,9 reversed a dis-
trict court forfeiture order granted on grounds that appellant had
driven the Corvette in an alleged drug transaction. In this case, the
suspect was arrested when he attempted to purchase cocaine from a
person already in police custody at the Miami International Airport.
2 0
The vehicle was the second of three cars the suspect used to get to the
airport. In fact, he drove the forfeited car only five blocks before
switching to another car which he parked at the airport.2' The Fifth
15. Id. at 130.
16. 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H. 1974).
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1205.
19. 496 F.2d 210 (5th Cir. 1974). According to the facts on record in the case,
Hilda Landeo, the Corvette owner, had returned to Miami, from Peru, only a few
hours before her arrest. Met at the airport by her husband, in a borrowed Cadillac,
they drove to visit her father-in-law and then drove to the couple's apartment where
they transferred from the Cadillac to the Corvette. They then parked the Corvette at
the father-in-law's house and took his Ford to the airport. Id. at 211.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 210.
.... ^
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Circuit Court of Appeal held that, at best, the Corvette was marginally
used to facilitate a contraband related offense. No nexus had been
demonstrated since there must be a showing beyond marginal connec-
tion before a vehicle forfeiture order will be sustained.22
Facts sufficient to meet the criteria for forfeiture were found in
United States v. One 1972 Pontiac GTO, 2-Door Hardtop,3 wherein a
government agent initiated a heroin purchase while sitting in the Pon-
tiac. Although the drug itself had not been delivered in the automobile,
the court justified forfeiture, finding "that the sale was consummated in
the car. ' '2 Here, the vehicle was involved in facilitating a drug transac-
tion, and forfeiture was clearly warranted.
A forfeiture order was also upheld in a federal court where mari-
juana and cocaine were found inside the car and where the owner was
charged with smuggling marijuana in the vehicle.25 Therefore, federal
courts seem to require a showing that the vehicle has been instrumental
in an act which violates drug or contraband statutes in order to justify
its forfeiture. In interpreting the intent of federal forfeiture statutes,26
most federal courts require this connection, holding mere possession of
contraband insufficient grounds for forfeiture.27
22. Id. at 212.
23. 529 F.2d 65 (9th Cir. 1976). Aside from the argument concerning the suffi-
ciency of nexus, the appellant also raised the questions of whether the forfeiture provi-
sions unconstitutionally impose the burden of proof upon the claimant and whether the
government must prove probable cause by clear and convincing evidence. These claims
were both rejected. Id. at 66.
24. Id.
25. 423 F. Supp. 1026 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
26. 49 U.S.C. §§ 781, 782. An interesting note is that many of the federal cases
discussing the statutory intent of the Congress in authorizing forfeiture did not cite
United States v. United States Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1971) which elevated
certain requirements for forfeiture to the level of constitutional requisites. The Court
reversed a forfeiture order sustained upon a conviction for failing to register as a gam-
bler and in their holding, they stated that, "When the forfeiture statutes are viewed in
their entirety, it is manifest that they are intended to impose a penalty only upon those
who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise." Id. at 721. While many courts
have used the language of "significant involvement" none have cited or attributed this
phrase to the case.
27. See note 13 supra, for a decision requiring minimal connection.
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HISTORY OF FORFEITURE IN FLORIDA
The forfeiture of vehicles related to seizures of contraband in Flor-
ida has been primarily governed by two statutes. The Uniform Nar-
cotic Drug Laws [hereinafter cited as UNDL], 28 first authorized forfei-
ture, giving all "authorized state officers the power to arrest any
persons violating the narcotic laws of the State and to seize all vehicles,
boats and aircraft used in violation of such laws." In 1974, the forfei-
ture provision was excised from the UNDL and consolidated with
other contraband statutes in the Florida UCTA.29
The Florida UCTA provides for forfeiture of vessels, motor vehi-
cles or aircraft, by the State Attorney within whose jurisdiction the
vessel, motor vehicle or aircraft is seized. The forfeiture order requires
a showing that the vehicle seized has been used "to transport, conceal,
or possess, . . . or used . . . to facilitate the transportation, carriage,
conveyance, concealment, receipt, possession, purchase, sale, barter,
exchange, or giving away of any contraband article." 0
The Florida UCTA, broader than the UNDL, extends beyond
narcotics to include other contraband articles as well. For example,
"gambling paraphernalia, lottery tickets . . . and currency used or in-
tended to be used in violation of the gambling laws . . .",31 or "[a]ny
equipment, . . . which is being used . . . in violation of the beverage
or tobacco laws of the state . . ."I can subject the vessel, motor vehi-
cle or aircraft holding these items to be seized in forfeiture
proceedings.
The Florida UCTA broadens the grounds for forfeiture proceed-
ings in addition to expanding the types of articles subject to its rule. It
provides for forfeiture in the instances where vehicles are used, or
where there has been an attempt to use a vehicle to facilitate the traf-
ficking of contraband, as opposed to the requirement of actual use set
forth in the earlier act. Judicial interpretation of what acts constitute
28. FLA. STAT. § 398.24 (2) (1970).
29. FLA. STAT. §§ 943.41-44.
30. FLA, STAT. § 943.42.
31. FLA. STAT. § 943.41. A case involving reversal of a forfeiture order of cur-
rency seized in connection with gambling allegations is reported in Baker v. State, 343
So. 2d 622 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied 348 So. 2d 953 (Fla. 1977).
32. FLA, STAT. § 943.41.
6
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"use" or "attempted use" of a vehicle for illegal purposes under
either forfeiture statute has been inconsistent, and the language of
both acts has given rise to controversy.
Under the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1973, 33 the First District Court of Appeal, in Grimm v.
State, ' sustained a forfeiture order where it was the passenger, not the
owner of the vehicle, who was convicted of possession of marijuana.
The court saw a clear mandate in the statute to uphold the trial court's
action despite the fact that no charge was ever filed against the owner.
Under the same act, however, Florida's Third District Court of
Appeal, in In re 1972 Porsche 2 Door,15 refused to find grounds for a
forfeiture when the owner of the vehicle was arrested for possession of
drugs, but his car was not shown to further any drug trafficking. In
denying the forfeiture motion, the court said:
[T]o forfeit the person's ownership of the vehicle just because they are
arrested for having some quantity of drugs, whether it be hard drugs or
not, is not the intent of this statute. . . I think it is whether the vehicle
is being used to further a drug operation. That is the way I have always
interpreted the statute. 36
Grimm and Porsche, thus exemplify the judicial controversy as to
the statutory intent of the Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion Control Act. It is hard to reconcile the fact that Grimm held that
the statutory intent allowed forfeiture of a vehicle where a passenger
possessed a mere 13 grams of marijuana whereas Porsche reached an
opposite interpretation of the statutory intent, requiring instead, a
33. FLA. STAT. § 893.12 (2) (1973). This act charges law enforcement agencies
with the responsibility of seizing contraband and vehicles, vessels and aircraft, and then
directs them to proceed with forfeiture pursuant to the Florida UCTA.
34. 305 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
35. 307 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975). The owner of a 1972 Porsche
had been arrested at the residence of another on charges of possession of cocaine and
marijuana. While conducting a post-arrest inventory of the vehicle, an officer found a
small amount of PCP under the seat of the car. It should be noted, however, that the
court based its decision on arguments that the PCP in the car was the subject of an
illegal search and that the state failed to show that "the individual was significantly
involved in a criminal enterprise." Id. at 452.
The criminal enterprise standard was established in United States v. United States
Coin and Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 722-23 (1971). See note 26, supra.
36. Id. at 452.
277 114:1980
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showing of a criminal intent to justify an order of forfeiture.
Porsche was cited approvingly in In Re Chevrolet Camaro,"
wherein appellee's Camaro had been seized after he was arrested for
possession of marijuana while in the vehicle. The Third District Court
of Appeal upheld the trial court order of forfeiture, giving authority to
the dicta in Porsche. "[F]orfeiture statutes are intended to apply to
those individuals who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise,
§ 943.43, Fla. Stat., . . . authorizing forfeitures, is discretionary, not
mandatory."3 The court in Camaro called for a showing beyond the
mere possession Grimm found sufficient, requiring significant involve-
ment in a criminal enterprise in order to justify a forfeiture; clearly this
is a more liberal interpretation of the contraband forfeiture statute.
In State v. Washington,39 wherein the defendant was awarded tow-
ing and storage costs that resulted from an overturned forfeiture order,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in dicta, reported the trial court's
finding that there were no grounds to support a forfeiture order where
the state declines to prosecute.
Helms v. One 1973 Chevrolet El Camino,4" introduced a require-
ment that there must be proof that links the vehicle to the offense
charged in order to justify forfeiture procedings. In this case, the Flor-
ida Supreme Court refused to find that the seized automobile was used
in connection with the offense charged.
These decisions interpreting the different forfeiture statutes suggest
that no forfeiture should be sustained where the state declines to prose-
cute on the charges giving rise to the seizure. Failure to do so would
also fail to link the automobile to the commission of the offense
charged. The controversy in the statutory interpretation of the acts
therefore arises from the district court decisions of Grimm, Porsche
and Camaro. These cases present the question of whether possession on
37. 334 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). The claimant "was arrested for
possession of marijuana while in his automobile. Mr. Costigliola pled guilty to the
charge and as a first offender was placed on probation." Id. at 82.
38. Id. at 83.
39. 352 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). The reversal of the lower
court implied that an improper forfeiture may leave the city liable for storing, towage
and resultant damage to the vehicle.
40. 343 So. 2d 604 (Fla. 1977). The Florida Supreme Court received this case on
transfer from the Third District Court of Appeal because of an apparent constitutional
issue. The supreme court found that there was "no need to address the asserted consti-
tutional issue." Id. ht 605.
8
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the person or in the vehicle constitutes sufficient cause for a forfeiture
order. This issue was addressed when the Florida Supreme Court
granted direct review in Griffis.
IMPACT OF GRIFFIS
The question of statutory interpretation remained in dispute until
the Florida Supreme Court reviewed a circuit court's order of forfei-
ture of a motor vehicle seized on the grounds that appellant possessed
marijuana and cocaine on his person and in the vehicle.4 The order of
forfeiture followed the entry of a plea of nolo contendere to possession
of marijuana, the cocaine charge having been dismissed by the state."
Before the supreme court, appellant again argued against the con-
stitutionality of the Florida UCTA, alleging that to "allow forfeiture
without evidence of trafficking would render the statutes void as viola-
tive of due process, equal protection, and double jeopardy provisions of
the Florida and United States Constitutions."4 The court agreed with
appellant's contention that forfeiture should require a showing of a
nexus between the vehicle and trafficking. However, in doing so, the
court found it unnecessary to reach any state or federal constitutional
issues, choosing instead to base its holding on an interpretation of both
the current statute and its predecessor.
In construing the Florida UCTA, the court held that the trial
court's literal reading of the statute was violative of the express legisla-
tive intent behind the enactment of the UCTA.44 Justice Karl, author
of the opinion, quoted the following language from the preamble to the
act: "Uniformity between the laws of Florida and the laws of the
United States was necessary and desirable for effective drug abuse pre-
vention and control."45 The court went on to find that this language
clearly evinced a legislative intent to achieve state and federal
uniformity."
After so concluding, the court analyzed the federal forfeiture stat-
41. 356 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1978).
42. Id. at 298.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 299.
45. Id. at 300.
46. Id.
9
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utes4" to determine whether a nexus is necessary under federal law. The
court specifically found the intent of Congress was to include such a
requirement. "The congressional committee report that accompanied
the amendment leaves no doubt that the congressional intent was not
to permit forfeiture for mere possession of a controlled substance but
to authorize forfeiture of those vehicles used in trafficking drugs in vio-
lation of the Internal Revenue laws." 48
As the federal forfeiture statute requires a showing of. a nexus, the
Florida UCTA must then also require a showing of trafficking before a
forfeiture action can be justified; the intent of the Florida Legislature
being to expressly achieve uniformity between the Florida and federal
forfeiture procedures.
In support of that proposition, the Griffis court noted language
from the decisiors in Datsun and Porsche. Datsun precluded forfeiture
where there was no clear relationship between the vehicle and posses-
sion or sale of drugs therein.49 The court therefore seemed to be inter-
preting statutory intent as requiring a showing beyond mere possession.
Griffis quoted similar language from Porsche: "forfeiture statutes...
are intended to apply to those persons significantly included in a crimi-
nal enterprise."' 0 Mere possession was not deemed sufficient to give
rise to a presumption of involvement in a criminal enterprise.
POST GRIFFIS
An examination of forfeiture appeals post-Griffis, reveals some
confusion at the trial court level as to the proper grounds for forfeiture.
Some trial courts still are ordering forfeiture in "mere possession" fact
situations.
A forfeiture order had to be quashed in Nichols v. State,5' after a
circuit court in Charlotte County, Florida, ordered the forfeiture of a
van because a search of it resulted in the discovery of a small quantity
47. Id. at 299.
48. Id. at 300.
49. 378 F. Supp. 1200 (D.N.H. 1974).
50. 356 So. 2d at 302.
51. 356 So. 2d 933 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978). The appellate court noted the
impact of Griffis, when it rejected a literal reading of the statute; "the teaching of the
Supreme Court of Florida in a very recent opinion, however, demonstrates that such
an approach is superficial." Id. at 934.
10
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of marijuana and the charging of the owner with possession. The Sec-
ond District Court of Appeal held that:
The trial judge applied the forfeiture statutes in a literal manner and
ordered forfeiture because a small amount of marijuana was found in the
vehicle while Nichols was legally in charge of it. Since, however, the
evidence before the trial court did not reveal any nexus between the con-
trolled substance found in the van and any illegal drug operation, this
appeal is directly controlled by the supreme court's opinion in Griffis v.
State, supra. Accordingly, the order of the trial court must be and is
hereby vacated."
In Brown v. State,5 3 appellant's car had been forfeited even though he
had not been charged with possession of marijuana. The evidentiary
hearing on the state's motion for forfeiture revealed:
A Jacksonville Beach police officer received information from a confi-
dential informant that Brown was in possession of marijuana. The officer
went to Brown's home where he saw Brown and two men get into the
car. The officer followed the car and when it stopped, identified himself
and asked if he could search the car. Brown consented to the search. The
officer found eight one-ounce baggies of marijuana in the trunk. Brown
denied they were his. 4
The trial court's forfeiture order was overturned because the district
court felt that there was no showing of a nexus. "[T]ransportation of a
controlled substance in a car which is only incidental to possession,
. . . is insufficient to invoke the forfeiture provisions of Sections
943.41-44. " Il
Other trial court decisions reveal confusion as to the sufficiency of
acts which will give rise to forfeiture. A trial court order denying for-
feiture was reversed and remanded by the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal in State v. Franzer.55 Franzer was arrested and pled nolo con-
tendere to charges of selling a large quantity of marijuana to Fort
52. Id. at 934.
53. 357 So. 2d 472 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Some of the evidence adduced
at the hearing included the fact "that Brown knew that thd marijuana was in the car."
Id. at 472.
54. Id. at 472.
55. Id. at 473.
56. 364 So. 2d 62 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
1
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Lauderdale police officers. He had delivered the drugs in his 1974 Cor-
vette. After a review of the statement of stipulated facts, the court held
that "the record reflects that the appellee's automobile was used as the
delivery vehicle in a scheme to promote the distribution of marijuana.
Use of a vehicle to deliver marijuana for sale is clearly sufficient to
bring into play the forfeiture provisions.""7
In line with its decision in Franzer, the Fourth District Court of
Appeal in Florida upheld a forfeiture order in Mosley v. State,"
wherein negotiations for the purchase of heroin, delivery, and payment,
were all accomplished in the forfeited vehicle. The appellant had at-
tempted to have the order vacated because the actual seizure of the car
took place eight days after the arrest. The court found the time delay
of no consequence and sustained the trial court order.
CONCLUSION
The holding in Griffis limits the ability of a State Attorney to
move for a forfeiture order in cases of mere possession of narcotics and
contraband. It seems clear from the opinion that due to the harshness
of forfeiture orders, Florida courts will, be required to find a clear
nexus between the use of the vehicle and the intent to traffic in drugs,
before an individual's property can be subjected to this penalty.
Griffis raises significant questions as to what constitutes a nexus,
as a nexus is deemed necessary to order forfeiture. While mere posses-
sion will not be sufficient, those facts which will permit forfeiture re-
main unclear.
Some of the criteria developed in federal case law may, however,
be applicable. For example, where the car is shown to be the location
of a narcotics transaction,59 and where the vehicle is used in facilitating
the smuggling of marijuana,"° sufficient rationale for forfeiture might
well lie within the limits contemplated by the legislature. However, fed-
eral criteria established through case law may not always be applicable
as in Jaguar, wherein the court was willing to order forfeiture upon a
showing of possession of cocaine by the driver.
57. Id. at 63.
58. Mosley v. State, 363 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
59. See note 23 supra.
60. See note 8 supra.
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In spite of occasional trial court forfeiture orders in cases of mere
possession, the impact of the Griffis decision appears to have been the
application of the legislature's intent to make clear that forfeiture is a
harsh penalty only to be ordered to curtail trafficking of narcotics and
contraband. Therefore, forfeitures seem non-applicable to casual con-
sumers of narcotic substances in a vehicle, nor to "mere possessors" of
small amounts of contraband. The federal and Florida forfeiture stat-
utes are meant to reach the tools of narcotics and contraband traffick-
ing in order to curtail those illegal activities, and the use of forfeiture
in instances of "mere possession" proves too harsh a penalty.
A recent examination of trial court forfeiture orders leads one to
conclude that many trial courts have not yet fully applied the guide-
lines established in the Grffis decision. Appellate review of improper
forfeiture orders provides some legal relief, however, the economic
costs of such review often exceed thb equity in the vehicle. In such
instances, an unfair penalty is wrought. There are criminal statutes
designed to govern acts of possession of drugs and contraband sub-
stances. To subject an individual to both criminal proceedings and for-
feiture orders, without a clear nexus between trafficking and the vehi-
cle, works an unfair double penalty. Griffis reaffirms the spirit of
fundamental fairness which we would hope to find in all statutes re-
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